DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 183 680 UD 020 311

AUTHOR La Belle, Thomas J.: White, Peter S.
TITLE Educational Policy and Intergroup Relations: An International and Comparative Analysis.
PUB DATE [79]
NOTE 74p.

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC03 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Access to Education: Caste: *Cross Cultural Studies: *Educational Policy: Ethnic Groups: *Foreign Countries: *Intergroup Relations: *Minority Groups: *Nondiscriminatory Education: Social Integration: Socialization

ABSTRACT

In many countries today it has become increasingly common for educational planners, administrators, and practitioners to more carefully attend to the needs of ethnic, class, caste, and other minority groups for increased access to and participation in schools. Schools are thought to be important institutions in this regard as they are perceived by subordinate groups as vehicles of social mobility. This paper presents a framework for analyzing school policies as they relate to societal integration in multiethnic societies. The framework points to two cultural and structural tendencies common to the integration process: homogenizing or centripetal and differentiating or centrifugal tendencies. These are apparent in the following examples of school policies: the control of educational decisions: access to schooling: how the early and later schooling experiences are articulated: the curricula: the selection and training of teachers: and the choice of language for instruction in the schools. This paper places the school policies, group tendencies, and societal integration mechanisms into a particular socio-cultural context by discussing four types of intergroup relations based on cultural and structural criteria. Using examples from various countries, based on these four types of intergroup relations, it is shown that overall societal tendencies are reflected in each nation's educational policies toward subordinate groups. (Author/RLV)

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Educational Policy and Intergroup Relations:
An International and Comparative Analysis

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Table of Contents

	Page
Chapter I:	
Introduction	1
Chapter II:	
Type A: Cultural and Structural Segmentation in a Vertical Relationship	14
Chapter III:	
Type B: Cultural Segmentation and Structural Commonality in a Vertical Relationship	24
Chapter IV:	
Type C: Cultural and Structural Segmentation in a Horizontal Relationship	35
Chapter V:	
Type D: Cultural Segmentation and Structural Commonality in a Horizontal Relationship	46
Chapter VI:	
Summary and Conclusion	58
References	65

Chapter I

Introduction

In many countries today it has become increasingly common for educational planners, administrators, and practitioners to more carefully attend to the demands of ethnic, class, caste and other minority or subordinate groups for increased access to and participation in schools. Schools are thought to be important institutions in this regard as they are perceived by subordinate groups as vehicles of social mobility, cultural identity, and for enabling individuals and groups to become involved in new ways in the wider society. From the dominant group's perspective, schools are also important because they are among the principal mechanisms that help to control and shape the nature of the relationship between groups and the rate of change in a given society. Our interest in this paper is in the educational policies of societies that are characterized as bi- or multi-ethnic. Specifically, we will propose a framework within which those policies can be discussed as aspects of broader governmental approaches to intergroup relations and societal integration.

Segmentation and education: Structural and cultural issues. All societies are characterized by forms of vertical and horizontal segmentation based on both cultural and structural attributes. Cultural segments are often referred to as ethnic groups in that they represent an attributed or self-proclaimed identity that involves certain religious, linguistic, or other collective symbols or representations. Structural groups, on the other hand, are often referred to as social classes or castes as they are based on the group's relative access to or possession

of political and economic power or resources. As societies sort out their social groups into superordinate and subordinate positions based on cultural, political, and economic characteristics, the result is a differential form of societal participation in accord with cultural and structural group membership.

Given formal education's acceptance by subordinate and superordinate groups alike as a legitimate locus of social selection and training, a critical question for educators is the interaction between the schools' purposes and processes and the cultural and structural divisions in a society: specifically, the extent to which schools act to maintain and perpetuate these divisions or act to reduce and ameliorate them. Structural analyses--those that emphasize the primacy of social class divisions--are represented by two opposing arguments, depending on whether the schooling process is viewed as fostering equality or inequality of opportunity and outcome. One set of arguments suggests that the extension of schooling to all social groups will act to structurally incorporate them on a roughly equal basis with society's more privileged groups. Mechanisms for providing these routes of mobility into the existing social structure includes an emphasis in urban areas on meaningful work-related skills tied to employment opportunities (Harbison, 1973), and in rural areas on the integration of education with community action programs (Coombs & Ahmed, 1974). Philip Foster (1978) contends that in developing, ex-colonial countries, the schools present no objective barrier to bridging structural divisions since achievement, if not access and promotion, in school are unrelated to a student's background. Meyer Weinberg (1972) takes a similar position on data drawn from the United States. In general, this argument assumes that income

and status are acquired by those who are most intelligent and skillful without regard to their social or cultural characteristics.

The opposing line of argument also emphasizes schooling as it relates to structural incorporation, but states that the resulting incorporation is both unequal and stratified. Schools are identified as actively contributing to the maintenance of socioeconomic divisions by rewarding personality traits that are related to particular roles in the economic structure. In this way, the school is said to reinforce social class characteristics brought to school by children, rather than altering or providing new characteristics. It is further argued that the widely held assumption that schools play a neutral role in selecting individuals for social rewards deflects potential protest away from the school and the socioeconomic system and on to the individuals who fail (Bowles, 1971; Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Bowles, Gintis, & Simmons, 1976). Others present evidence that schooling contributes little to social mobility and that technical skills have little to do with explaining social stratification (Collins, 1971, 1976). A related argument by Cohen (1975) sees schools as reinforcing, not creating, social distinctions in society. He argues that the extension of education to non-elites is intended to placate non-elites and gain their compliance without changing their position in society.

Perhaps the most adamant expression of the schooling and structural inequality argument is provided by Martin Carnoy (1976). He argues that the school's bias toward upper-class values (e.g., in curriculum teaching styles, etc) makes education a reinforcing agent to existing inequality, in effect "colonizing" people into believing that they are failures or encouraging them to be successful while ensuring their failure.

Whether schools are perceived as part of a highly rational system which rewards knowledge and skills without regard to background, or as mechanisms for preserving class privilege, the emphasis in these arguments is on socioeconomic roles and statuses. Cultural or ethnic segmentation is seen as a confounding and rather minor factor.

On the other hand, a cultural analysis--when cultural, or racial and ethnic characteristics such as phenotype, language and religion are seen as the basic divisions in a society--draws attention to the effects of cultural characteristics and identification on an individual's or group's later position in the socioeconomic hierarchy (Barth, 1969; Barth & Noel, 1972; Despres, 1975; Lieberson, 1970). Ogbu, for example, accounts for the effects of education on one's socioeconomic position by arguing that dominant cultural groups provide inferior schooling to caste-like racial and ethnic minorities and limit their access to the rewards of schooling in later life. Consequently, the cultural minorities adapt their socialization practices to their assigned status in society, thereby determining to a considerable extent the perpetuation of the group's status.

As with the structural focus, the bulk of the literature on the relationship between cultural factors and schooling portrays the school as dominated culturally--and exclusively so--by one group in society. The dominant group is said to use schooling to impose its ways on other groups and, simultaneously, to justify the low status of other groups (Carnoy, 1976; Conlin, 1974; Foley, 1978; Ogbu, 1978; Van den Berghe, 1978; Wang, 1978). Systematic exposure and adherence to the culture of the dominant group is intended to reflect and reinforce the vertical hierarchy in society, and schooling becomes a principal mechanism for

supporting the cultural stratification system. Collins (1976), for example, perceives education as having been molded to "transform cultural credentials into formal academic credentials, so that the original struggle of ethnic cultures has become disguised and even somewhat displaced" (p. 69). In this process of cultural socialization and the struggle for culturally sanctioned credentials, only members of the dominant group are automatically successful in "cashing in" their educational experiences for access to the highest paying and most prestigious jobs.

As useful as these various arguments are for individual case studies, both the schooling for equality as well as the schooling for inequality arguments are far too severe for cross-national analysis. Most authors recognize this, even for individual studies, but relatively few propose, much less employ, more complex sets of factors. Furthermore, the interactive effects of structural and cultural criteria for societal segmentation requires a combination of these factors for advancing our understanding of schooling in the integration process. Singleton (1977) reviews the comparative education literature on these two criteria and documents the tendency to separate ethnicity from social class for analytic purposes, noting that there has been a clear emphasis on the latter. He suggests, instead, that ethnicity be examined as a political and organizational phenomenon that combines symbolic action with power relationships. In effect, Singleton attempts to juxtapose ethnic membership and socioeconomic status. Kuper (1971) also seeks this kind of juxtaposition, but with a cautionary note that the two are not equivalent and that they are often difficult to sort out.

As we shall demonstrate in the following pages, the role and function of schooling in segmented societies can best be analyzed through a use of both structural and cultural criteria and with attention to both superordinate and subordinate group perspectives. In other words, it cannot be assumed that schools in a particular segmented society--much less schools in all such societies--attend to one dimension of segmentation exclusively, nor that schools serve only to oppress subordinate groups. What we propose, then, is a kind of "contextual lens" through which the complexities of educational policy, with all its many apparent contradictions, can be fully considered and, indeed, appreciated. We shall document some of these cases while hypothesizing as to their actual effects. Before turning to these cases, it is necessary that we attend to the integrative processes by which groups interact in society, to the particular educational policy areas of concern, and to a typology of intergroup relations, which provides the contextual framework for the analysis.

Societal integration. How various groups interact within the bounds of a single society or political entity is referred to here as integration. Drawing on Schermerhorn, we would emphasize the dynamic nature of integration; it is not a state of being, but rather:

> A process whereby units or elements of a society are brought into an active and coordinated compliance with on-going activities and objectives of the dominant group in that society (1970, p. 14).

We see the process of integration as consisting of two interrelated aspects. The first is suggested by Schermerhorn's "paired concept" of centripetal and centrifugal tendencies. A centripetal tendency refers to cultural and structural trends toward common, society-wide lifestyles

and institutional participation, while a centrifugal tendency would manifest itself in a group's attempts to retain and preserve unique cultural attributes as well as to seek greater autonomy politically and economically. If the superordinates and subordinates share a tendency, whether centripetal or centrifugal, Schermerhorn indicates that an agreed-upon form of integration is likely to take place. If the tendencies differ--one group seeking closer ties while the other seeks autonomy, for example--the integrative process is likely to be conflictual in nature. It is the tendency of both groups--the congruence or difference of aims--that must be taken into account.

Building on Schermerhorn's outline, we would suggest that a group's centripetal or centrifugal tendencies be discussed not in overall terms but rather in terms of the group's separate structural and cultural interests. In our educational analysis, this permits us to account for what often appear to be contradictory trends in a superordinate group's stance vis-a-vis educational policies. On the one hand, for example, a policy of cultural centrifugality might encourage each group's language to be used as the instructional idiom at the local level. Simultaneously, however, the standards for proceeding through the educational system and the mechanisms for decision making might be quite uniform and centrally coordinated or controlled. This latter policy would be an example of structural centripetality, as the desire of the superordinate group would be to incorporate the school and its participants into the nation-state's economic and political spheres. It is possible, then, to have both centripetality and centrifugality present in a single educational system. Although such dual tendencies may be seen as contradictory by policy makers, for analytical purposes it is well to remember that they can and often do exist simultaneously.

In addition to centripetal and centrifugal tendencies, we suggest that the process of integration has a second aspect, one that we call "integrative mechanisms." These are the general approaches employed by superordinate groups to implement their definition of societal integration. The three mechanisms we have found applicable to intergroup relations are coercion, interdependence, and consensus. Like the centripetal/centrifugal tendencies, more than one of these mechanisms may be employed in a single intergroup relationship; one mechanism may be preferred for structural relationships within the society, while another mechanism is favored for purposes of cultural relations.

Coercion will be used here to describe superordinate actions that rely on the application of military or police forces or nonconsensual economic, social, or political pressures for their implementation. Such coercion usually takes place in cases where the ethnic groups or social classes are oriented to the attainment of incompatible or mutually exclusive goals (Barth and Noel, 1972). The incompatibility may be either centripetal or centrifugal; that is, a subordinate group seeking greater access while the superordinate group seeks to maintain its privileges, or the subordinate group seeking greater autonomy in the face of strongly incorporative plans by the superordinate group (Paulston, 1976).

A second integrative mechanism employed by superordinate groups is the establishment of consensus among all the various groups into which the society is divided. Consensus is often seen as the natural outcome of a set of values--cultural, economic, political, etc.--that is held in common by two or more groups; its commonality is assumed to provide the basis for between-group agreement on societal goals (Barth & Noel, 1972).

We would point out, however, that consensus can exist where no values are held in common. In extreme cases, two or more groups can share the territory of a single political entity yet be so divergent in every other respect as to seek autonomy; convenience alone, such as the threat of a mutual neighbor, would be the binding tie and consensus would consist of little more than an "agreement to disagree."

The third integrative mechanism--interdependence--is somewhat wider in its utility to superordinate groups than is consensus. Interdependence is essentially a structural relationship in which groups or segments of those groups function within a common network of economic and social order--factory work, marketplaces, and so forth--without necessarily sharing any cultural or political values (Paulston, 1976), or without agreeing upon the fairness of the network itself. As such, interdependence is useful where cultural differences between groups are great--a gap that consensus cannot always bridge. Further, interdependence for integration may be equally applicable across a whole range of structural relationships, from those of sharp inequality between groups to those where groups are equal in power and thus more jealous of their cultural prerogatives.

From this perspective, education is not, of itself, an integrative mechanism in the relations between ethnic, social, and other groups in segmented societies. Instead, schools are one institution through which those mechanisms take concrete form. Similarly, schools cannot automatically be assumed to be agents of subordinate group assimilation to the superordinate system. As we have suggested, superordinate groups are as likely to employ education for centrifugal purposes as for centripetal ones.

Educational policy areas. Our attention is on school policies as the expression, within particular relationships between groups, of the tendencies and mechanisms that shape societal integration in multigroup settings. Five areas of educational policy expression were chosen for more detailed examination, in part on the basis of our a priori assumptions as to their importance in integrative efforts and in part on their recurrence in our review of descriptions of schooling in multigroup societies. The first area is that of the relative centralization of a society's system of schools. One dimension of centralization is the extent to which the state controls the right to educate. For example, a strong system of religious and/or private schools parallel to the state-supported schools would be an instance of relative decentralization. The other dimension of centralization can be illustrated by financial, curricular, administrative, and personnel policies that delimit the role of the central government in the individual school. Where a school receives all its support, materials, and personnel by directive of national educational authorities, a high degree of centralization exists. Conversely, greater local or group-specific responsibility in these financial and other matters would indicate a higher degree of decentralization in schooling.

Access to education, our second policy area, consists of the pattern of initial enrollment in schools (i.e., what are the opportunities and facilities for the various groups to get their children onto the first rung of formal education?), the internal processes of schooling which aid or hinder the advancement of different groups through to school completion, and the nature of the facilities or barriers to advancement between levels of formal schooling.

The third area of interest in educational policy is articulation and tracking. By articulation we mean a coordination between one level and the next, e.g., primary schooling as a necessary and sufficient preparation for secondary schooling. Structural examples of articulation would be the provision of general education at the secondary level where the primary schools are essentially general in nature, or of vocational secondary schools where the primary experience is largely vocational preparation. In discussing tracking, we mean two things. First, the point in schools at which students in multigroup societies begin to follow highly specialized (e.g., vocational) curricula. Second, the degree to which those tracks, whether academic or vocational/technical, are permeable. That is, can students switch tracks, and if so, up until what point? The fourth policy area, curriculum, includes all regulations governing the content of particular courses of study. Language policies, the fifth area, are those regulations that govern the selection and use of the media of instruction and materials for the schools.

A typology of intergroup relationships. In the analysis of educational policies for intergroup relations, we were faced with the need to develop an heuristic typology of societies based, in part, on the concepts outlined above. Even though our interest is with educational policies rather than with differentiating among types of intergroup relations per se, it was necessary that we attempt to account for the wide between-country variation that we observed in educational policies as they related to majority/minority or subordinate/superordinate relations. As Hopper (1968) notes, even where national educational systems happen to share policies in one or more areas, they often diverge sharply in other areas. A policy indicating a centrifugal tendency in one intergroup context, for example, often enough indicates centripetality elsewhere.

In the construction of a workable typology of intergroup relations, our approach has been to inductively generate the typology from societal case studies taken primarily from the literature, as well as to review typologies proposed by, among others, Jacob and Teure (1964), Rabushka and Shepsle (1972), Schermerhorn (1970), Wirt (1979), and Young (1976). The typology that we propose here attends to how group membership affects socioeconomic roles, the mode and level of participation in institutional decision making, and the extent to which issues of cultural identity and values are associated with group boundaries. As with other typologies, these characteristics must be analyzed within a particular historical context where between-group transactions may be viewed across time. One axis of the typology is structural power as reflected in political and economic resources. The other axis is the culturally defined status and prestige that shape cultural and racial hierarchies as well as cultural group boundaries (see Figure 1). Education is assumed to be important in this cultural and structural interaction because it functions both as a selection and sorting device for the dominant group, and as one possible channel of mobility for the subordinate group.

Figure 1

TYPES OF INTER-GROUP RELATIONS



Type A:

Cultural and structural segmentation in a vertical relationship



Type B:

Gultural segmentation and structural commonality in a vertical relationship



Type C:

Cultural and structural segmentation in a horizontal relationship



Type D:

Cultural segmentation and structural commonality in a horizontal relationship

———— cultural boundaries

- - - - - - - - - structural boundaries

Chapter II

Type A: Cultural and Structural Segmentation in a Vertical Relationship

Type A intergroup relations are characterized by two or more groups whose differences along ethnic lines are highlighted and reinforced by the near monopoly of cultural prestige, political power, and economic power exercised by one group over the other group(s). The superordinate group fills the powerful and rewarding positions in the system with members of its own group, while subordinate group members are systematically assigned to fill society's lowest occupational and social positions. Since ethnicity and class are nearly congruent, superordinate members rarely if ever occupy low-status positions and, conversely, subordinate members may be legally or traditionally proscribed from holding positions in the upper echelons of society's structures.

The relative permeability of between-group barriers, and by extension the role of educational policy in maintaining the barriers or promoting movement across them, can in large part be traced to the superordinate group's definition of appropriate societal integration. Given the strict verticality of a Type A relationship, integration is likely to be interpreted narrowly. It could range from a simple crystalization of existing group differences to the selective absorption of relatively few individual subordinate group members into the superordinate sphere. In the case of simple crystalization, policies in both the cultural and structural realm will tend toward centrifugality; the superordinate group will seek to keep the subordinate group(s) as distinct as possible. The promotion of local customs and languages

would be one type of cultural policy to further that end. In the case of selective absorption, a centripetal tendency in cultural policies (e.g., insistence on use of the superordinate language by all citizens) could be accompanied by centrifugality in structural matters (e.g., maintenance of traditional landholding patterns). This would allow for the kind of individual, rather than group, incorporation a superordinate group would find acceptable within a Type A relationship.

Peru is a clear example of a Type A intergroup relationship. The "white" or mestizo segment of the population distinguishes itself from the indigenous, overwhelmingly rural masses by criteria of both ethnicity (language, dress, folk beliefs, historical and cultural traditions) and occupation (secondary and tertiary sectors of employment rather than agriculture). It also controls all legitmated power and prestige, relegating the "Indians" to the margins of official political and cultural life. Van den Berghe (1975) notes the virtual congruence between low socioeconomic position in Peru and one's identification as "Indian" according to various essentially subjective ethnic criteria. Changes in Peruvian government policies over the past 10 years, including a glorification of the indigenous past, have not by themselves altered the basic form of intergroup relations in the country. Rather, what appears to have taken place is a reaffirmation of the centripetal cultural goal of eventually assimilating the indigenous population into the "national" mainstream, and an extension of the traditional structural channels--especially schooling--by which individuals are brought into the superordinate system.

At first glance, Haiti stands out as a somewhat anomalous example of Type A relations because of the racial homogeneity of its population,

i.e., all black except for a handful of foreign residents. Nevertheless, the differentiation within the Haitian society and economy is so great as to approach a caste rather than a class system (Leyburn, 1966). A tiny elite of mulattoes and urban black bourgeoisie (perhaps 5% of the total population) draw the line between themselves and the masses (black or "creoles") on virtually every dimension of Haitian cultural and economic life: urban rather than rural residence, French-speaking rather than creole-speaking, commercial and white-collar jobs rather than manual labor and agriculture, literacy instead of illiteracy, Catholicism instead of voudon ("voodoo"), lighter skin rather than darker skin. As in Peru, the "racial" division (black vs. mulatto) often serves as a shorthand for the entire range of societal problems. Mintz (1974), for example, emphasizes the structural, not racial, basis of the differences between elites and masses in Haiti. In general terms, Haitian government policies vis-a-vis the country's subordinate creole group resemble the Peruvian case in the possibilities offered for limited, individual absorption into the superordinate structure via a process of ethnic and cultural re-labeling in which formal education plays a central role.

South Africa is perhaps the archtype of this kind of relationship. It stands out clearly in the two areas which, as we have seen, are characteristic of the Type A intergroup situation: the existence of sharp between-group differentiation by ethnic diacritica--race, phenotype, language, culture, historical traditions--and a strict verticality and mutual exclusivity in their structural and cultural relations. Apartheid legislation in South Africa is intended to guide a clearly centrifugal process of "parallel development" along racial lines. In so doing,

apartheid serves to make even more impermeable the structural barriers between South Africa's major groups. The 1960 census, for example, showed that in the Johannesburg area less than 1% of the Black Africans were in the professional, technical, or administrative occupations while 50% were laborers in mines or in other forms of production (Tunmer, 1972). In contrast to our other two cases, Peru and Haiti, assimilation of even selected subordinate group members plays no part in South Africa's overall definition of societal integration. The government actively promotes European culture (for whites) and African culture (for blacks) as separate, nonoverlapping spheres; contact between them is closely controlled, and individual or group "borrowing" of elements from the opposite group's culture is discouraged by means of legal sanctions.

Type A relationships are not tranquil or stable by any means. The margination and rigid domination characteristic of Type A ties frequently engender revolt and dissent on the part of the subordinate groups. Armed uprisings in highland Peru and rural Haiti have been recurrent phenomena in the history of those two countries, as have instances of black dissent and, more recently, open conflict in South Africa. Amidst this inter-group disparity and divisiveness, maintenance of the status quo, which favors the superordinate group, usually requires the frequent application of coersive measures against the subordinate group. This may take the form of military coersion to counter the subordinate group's centrifugal structural tendencies (e.g., demands for greater autonomy or even separation), as in the case of the blacks in South Africa and the land revolts in highland Peru. It can also manifest itself as political or economic pressure against the subordinate groups' centripetal structural or cultural tendencies, that is their efforts to join the

superordinate society on a more equal footing. South African apartheid, the maintenance of traditional landholding patterns in Peru or Haiti, and the denigration of the creole language in Haiti are all superordinate responses to the possibility of group-based changes, e.g., upward mobility, in the social hierarchy.

As Schermerhorn (1970) points out, however, coercion alone cannot hold together a society indefinitely; the superordinate groups have to find more stable, acceptable ways of satisfying subordinate group demands, while keeping the status quo intact. One such alternative strategy has been to highlight the very real--albeit unequal--political, economic, and social interdependence that binds the groups together in one society. That is, superordinate groups point out the beneficial aspects of the status quo for the subordinate groups and, in turn, acknowledge (in part) the contribution those groups make to the nation. South Africa has, for example, made the interdependence approach the official policy in its "homelands" strategy of separate but closely cooperating "nations" based on race and ethnicity within the present borders of the country.

A second non-coersive strategy of forging internal unity in Type A relationships is the building of consensus through intergroup agreement on specific issues. The issues involved may include cultural items--bilingual education in Peru--or, more typically, economic matters. Hence, the limited extension of lower-level urban employment opportunities to blacks in South Africa and, to a lesser degree, to creoles in Haiti. Yet building consensus is difficult and usually of short duration in Type A relationships because of the inherently one-sided nature of the benefits to be distributed. The "agreement" or consensus eventually breaks down because it is tailored to fit the needs of the superordinate

group. The "job ceiling" encountered by urban blacks in South Africa and the continued social and political discrimination against Haitian creoles point to the short life expectancy of such ameliorative reforms.

Control of schools in all our Type A societies is vested in the central government, and access to all levels of schooling, as well as the patterns of articulation and tracking, coincide with ethnic group boundaries. Specifically, subordinate groups have less opportunity to enter schools and less chance of competing successfully in them. The geographic distribution of school sites works against the creoles in Haiti and the blacks in South Africa, and a similar concentration of schools in urban areas has much the same negative effect on indigenous enrollment in Peru. These initial structural barriers are then compounded within the few subordinate group schools by lack of materials, poorly trained personnel, and a hidden tracking toward low-wage skills (Ballon, et al., 1978; Erickson, et al., 1965).

Haiti is a classic example of how these various factors, including curriculum and language biases, are reflected in the differential access to education by the various groups in society. In 1961 only 25% of <u>all</u> elementary-age children were enrolled in school. And despite the concentration of the Haitian population in rural areas (90%), urban elementary students (overwhelmingly mulatto) outnumbered rural elementary students three-to-two (Rubin & Schaedel, 1975). By 1967 the ratio was even more imbalanced; further, 60% of rural enrollment was in kindergarten alone, while 1% of rural enrollment was in the sixth year of primary school. At the secondary level rural/creole students were at an even greater disadvantage. Of the 70+ general high schools, none was in a rural area; only two of the 105 secondary units (i.e., technical,

agricultural, etc.) in Haiti were in the rural, i.e., creole, area (Weil, 1973). Enrollment at that level means, almost by definition, prior residence in an urban area or the ability and motivation to move there. Creoles, then, are excluded.

Within the schools themselves, both the structural articulation between levels of schools and the tracking of students into vocational or academic training tend to affect subordinate group members in ways which are congruent with the overall patterns of relations in a Type A situation. That is, schooling is often a dead end, terminating at a level or a track which leads directly back into the kind of closed occupations which are characteristic of the subordinate status. A physical barrier to complete articulation of schools for subordinate groups is the lack of secondary schools in those regions where the groups tend to reside, e.g., rural areas. In Peru and Haiti most school construction has taken place in the cities while little if any has occurred in rural areas.

A more subtle obstacle to articulation is the urging of technical/vocational type secondary education for subordinate group members. Peruvian agricultural and animal husbandry schools in the indigenous highlands--often a "side track" for young adults who had not completed primary school at all--were a common educational structural strategy through the 1960s. This kind of overt tracking remains firmly in place under South Africa's Bantu Education Act, which emphasizes the very basic manual and agricultural skills deemed necessary for the "separate development" of black "homelands" dependent on an industrialized white South Africa. The Act is clearly intended to train Blacks for a strictly limited physical and cultural environment.

Curriculum in schools under Type A conditions likewise evidence both centripetal and centrifugal tendencies. Course content is the same for all students in Haiti and Peru, a strategy we would classify as indicative of the superordinate group's centripetal tendencies in the cultural sphere. But there are a number of factors which act to make such curricular uniformity a barrier to integration through schooling. In Peru, for example, the content and materials reflect a strong bias toward urban, upper, and upper-middle class experience and interests (Boggio, et al., 1973). The indigenous student lacks any familiar item with which to relate as he/she enters school. In much the same way, the most common complaint concerning Haitian education is its highly "classical" (i.e., humanities and social sciences) emphasis and its complete reliance on French as the language of instruction (Mitchell, 1968). Since 90% of the population speaks no French (creole and French are mutually unintelligible), the rural creole and urban poor are at an immediate, and usually permanent, disadvantage.

South Africa has taken a very different course of action, implementing a policy of cultural centrifugality (i.e., separation of groups) in school curricula, despite subordinate group demands for centripetality (i.e., drawing closer to the upper groups). Among the Bantu Act's provisions, new curricula had to be devised to ensure the preservation and enrichment of "Bantu" culture. Hence the Act, while technically providing equal educational opportunity, was really geared to a perpetuation of the lifestyle of the "Bantu" and to preventing them from acquiring the skills which would make them competitive with the whites.

It is the source of the curriculum in a Type A relationship, then, that renders it a tool of continued intergroup separation; reflective as

it is of only one experience in a heterogeneous society, the school content selects students according to their ability to grasp superordinate styles. It thus eliminates and channels the vast majority of subordinate group members into positions reserved for "failures" and the "noneducated."

Language of instruction is the final area of school policies in which our examples of Type A intergroup relationships seem to indicate the strength of centrifugal tendencies in the maintenance of the unequal status quo. South Africa's Bantu Education Act requires that the vernacular be the medium of instruction throughout schooling. By learning a special curricula through the mother tongue, the African child is exposed to little of the outside world and only enough English and Afrikaans to follow instructions as workers (Whately, 1955). Cutting the Bantu off in this way also closes the door to social mobility except as it occurs in the tribal social system or at the lowest levels of dominant white society (Bernstein, 1972). By relying on one language--that of the superordinate group--the Peruvian and Haitian schools reinforce the position of the superordinate group as a cultural model and thus act as a standardizing mechanism within a heterogenous society.

Among segmented societies, it is the Type A relationship that most easily lends itself to the rigid, confluctual interpretation of educational functions offered by Bowles, Conroy, and others. Here the schools do, in fact, serve a clearly identified, elite--social and cultural--group in a largely exclusionary role. Most subordinate group members are kept out entirely or, once admitted, offered an educational content that leads either to early failure or later and limited assimilation. Because of the congruence of social class and ethnicity

in Type A situations, a single analytic perspective--examining structural divisions only or, conversely, cultural ones--is often used, and in some cases without greatly distorting societal reality. However, as we have pointed out, the problem is in transferring that unidimensional approach to other more intricate intergroup relationships.

Chapter III

Type B: Cultural Segmentation and Structural Commonality in a Vertical Relationship

Intergroup relations characterized as Type B involve two or more distinct groups, one of which is clearly dominant politically and/or economically, and whose traits tend to be used as the criteria against which all societal behaviors are judged. The nature and extent of an individual's participation in society, then, differ in accord with group membership. In contradistinction to a Type A relationship, however, occupation or role per se is not one of the salient distinguishing features of ethnic group membership, and the nature of socioeconomic participation is not completely congruent with ethnic group boundaries.

Although most of society's low-status positions are, in fact, filled by members of the subordinate group(s), they can also be occupied by members of the superordinate group. Similarly, access to roles at the top of the role hierarchy in a Type B situation is open to some subordinate group individuals, albeit with a greater expectation that these individuals will adopt at least some of the ethnic-related as well as class-related value orientations of the dominant group. In short, Type B situations are more permeable than are Type A, but there is still a superordinate group which can be expected to protect its prerogatives. Ethnic and social characteristics play an important but not exclusive role in the allocation of roles and prestige in Type B situations. Under these conditions, societal integration as a strategy of the superordinate group vis-a-vis the subordinate groups rests primarily on the extension of relative benefits within the existing occupational and

role structure; the underlying assumption is that the system's cross-group inclusiveness provides sufficient structural access to all society members.

The policies adopted by superordinate groups to bring about integration in a Type B context are essentially centripetal in their intent. In the cultural realm, there is an emphasis on the superordinate group as a society-wide model, e.g., exclusive use of the superordinate language and a concomitant silence on the subordinate groups' experience or culture. Where the subordinate culture is recognized, it may be only in a historical or folkloric manner, or it may be used as a "bridge" to the approved culture. Certain types of bilingual education or multicultural curricula in the schools fall into this latter category.

Structural policies in Type B contexts are likewise centripetal in their overall tendency. If only to maintain the status quo, superordinate groups attempt to incorporate others into the prevailing economic and institutional system and, in so doing, often act to eliminate any vestiges of autonomous subordinate group activities. These structural policies may take the form of industrial and commercial decentralization to subordinate group regions, the promotion of subordinate group migration to superordinate areas, the extension of traditional political party mechanisms or labor union organization to include subordinate populations, the use of job-related skills training programs, and so forth.

Although intergroup relations in most countries of the world can be broadly characterized as Type B, we have chosen to illustrate our discussion with several cases in which the Type B characteristics are especially evident. Specifically, we will look at the Buraku people of

Japan, Maoris in New Zealand, and West Indians in Britain because of the clear ethnic and other distinctions between the groups, and because of the incomplete congruence between ethnic group membership and the individual's role in the structural system. This more open system manifests itself in school policies, where at least token steps are often taken to increase equality of opportunity in and through the educational system. We will first outline the extent to which group boundaries are permeable in the cultural sphere and the structural or occupational sphere in these societies. Subsequently we will turn to a discussion of educational policies and their role in the promotion of a Type B approach to societal integration.

In Japan the Buraku people have been referred to as the country's "invisible race" (Wagatsuma & De Vos, 1967). In the early 17th century the Burakumin ("people of special or unliberated communities") were declared untouchable and a hereditary caste who had to wear special clothing and were forbidden from intermarrying with other Japanese. Because their occupations were considered "polluting" (e.g., leather working, slaughtering and skinning animals), they had to live in separate communities (Wagatsuma, 1967a). Although in 1871 this caste status for the Buraku people was abolished, the social and economic life of the population remained much the same as informal sanctions by the dominant group continued to prevent integration. Today the Buraku number between one and three million, living in some 6,000 rural and urban communities (De Vos, 1973).

The Burakumin have traditionally been at the bottom of the employment, income, and general socioeconomic status levels in Japanese society. In a survey of the Osaka area in 1973, only .01% had reached a

professional level, such as a lawyer or physician (Hawkins, 1977). Although discrimination and prejudice are unconstitutional in Japan, the evidence clearly indicates that employers are reluctant to hire Burakumin for positions not heavily oriented toward manual labor (De Vos, 1973). The structural centripetality has no corresponding tendency in the cultural realm because the Buraku have no objectively defined differences from the dominant Japanese culture. They share no common or distinct dialect, are phenotypically indistinguishable from the general population, and do not profess separate historical or religious ties.

A second example of Type B relations is the case of the indigenous Polynesians (Maoris) and the immigrant European population (Pakeha) in New Zealand. Violent conflict between European settlers and British troops on one side and the Maoris on the other ended in the final defeat of the Maoris in 1872. From that point to almost the end of the century, the Maoris remained both physically and psychologically separated from the European society. This appears to have been as much the result of exclusionist European policies in urban residence and occupations as it was of the Maoris' own desire to withdraw from the debilitating and humiliating contact with the new settlers.

The subordinate, but not entirely circumscribed status of the contemporary Maori in New Zealand can be seen in the nearly half of their numbers who are now urban dwellers. Indeed, one child in six in the Auckland public schools is Maori. Yet nearly 60% of Maori school leavers in 1969 entered unskilled and less secure jobs compared with less than 25% of non-Maori school leavers (Walsh, 1973). In 1966, approximately 68% of all Maori males as opposed to 46% of non-Maori males, were in the group of craftsmen, production process workers, laborers, and transport and communication workers (Garrett, 1973).

In the cultural sphere, the dominant Pakeha have followed a variety of centripetal policies, generally encouraging the wider use of English and the greater participation of the Maori in the essentially European-based national culture. Recent decades, however, have seen a greater assertion of native culture by the Maori themselves, and the dominant group in New Zealand has acceded to this somewhat, albeit within carefully controlled limits such as the school system. Although bicultural education and other methods of attending to the cultural background of Maori children have occurred, the Maori remain less well represented than the Pakeha in higher levels of schooling and in performance on standardized tests as well as in classrooms (Ogbu, 1978).

The largest group of "colored immigrants" in Britain are the West Indians, most of whom first came to Britain following the Second World War in response to labor shortages (Rose, 1969; Krausz, 1971). While none of the post-war immigrant minorities have been able to completely penetrate group boundaries for social and economic mobility in Britain, the most rigid line appears to apply to the West Indians, largely on the salience accorded to skin color (Ogbu, 1978). The nonstandard West Indian patois or creole variations on the English language are also seen as important indicators of subordinate group membership. Ogbu (1978) also argues that West Indian immigrants confront a job ceiling which means some occupational downgrading upon arrival as well as exclusion from the more desirable occupations. Once employed, West Indians are advanced more slowly and are generally not given employment commensurate with their education and experience. Krausz (1971) reports that the British census of 1966 indicates that West Indians were the least well-represented group in managerial, professional, and other nonmanual positions in Britain.

Government policy toward West Indians residing in Britain has been clearly centripetal in its intent, as in its sponsorship of legislation which prohibits discrimination in hiring, housing, education, and so forth (Hill, 1970; Rose, 1969). Further structural integration of the West Indians has been at least tacitly encouraged by Britain's well-developed industrial and service sectors, their concentration in urban areas, and the West Indians' status as fairly recent immigrants. Coming to Britain as they do to find work in existing economic activities, West Indians are heavily concentrated in cities and thus are in close contact with the dominant system. There has been little time and even less "room" for the West Indians to establish a unique or autonomous structural role for themselves in Britain. In doing little or nothing to accommodate the uniquely Caribbean aspects of West Indian lifeways, e.g., nonstandard language, official cultural policy vis-a-vis the blacks is also centripetal and, further, does not greatly deviate from the norms of the subordinate group itself, which has traditionally identified itself with Britain and British culture.

The emphasis on building consensus between groups, usually on terms set by the dominant partner in the relationship, is apparent in the centripetal tendency of cultural policies in all three of the Type B relationships examined here. Intergroup relations of the type represented by Japan, Britain, and New Zealand imply a definition of societal integration predicated on the ultimate absorption of the subordinate population into the structural and cultural system of the superordinate group. The relative stability of these relations over time, and their maintenance by strategies other than coercion, is due in no small part to the size of the superordinate group as well as its firm control of

practically all the important levers of social control. More important, however, are the "openings" to some of the benefits of the dominant group, whether as a result of unintended forces in these societies (e.g., urbanization and industrialization) or as a result of policies of the dominant groups themselves. At the same time, we have noted that the Maori, Burakumin, and West Indians remain as distinct ethnic groups that occupy predominantly lower-status positions in their respective societies. An examination of educational policy is especially appropriate here because of schooling's dual--and potentially conflicting--tasks of social promotion and social selection.

Centripetal tendencies in Type B school policies can be identified in several areas. First, the educational systems are highly centralized and access is initially broad for all groups. The growing centralization under government control of the British school system is illustrative of the importance attached to education in strategies for national or societal integration. By serving a nationwide (and thereby essentially native white) constituency, the school system discourages subordinate group participation even as it acts, on other levels, to incorporate that population into British life. Much the same can be said of the Buraku vis-a-vis Japan's highly centralized educational bureaucracy.

Education in New Zealand is no less centralized, but it has been marked by a more conscious attention to the special position of the Maoris. In the early part of the century the government policy was a parallel--yet centralized and white-controlled--system of schools for Maori children, intended primarily to ease Maoris into the Pakeha system while preserving much of Maori culture. Since the late 1950s the government has slowly moved towards a merger of the two systems,

retaining only a cultural component in the curriculum and extending it to all New Zealand public schools. The New Zealand case points to the variations possible in a Type B relationship, but it likewise indicates that centralization as such is a common mechanism for incorporating subordinate populations while at the same time maintaining their powerlessness.

In Britain as in Japan and New Zealand, schooling is free and compulsory until age 15, or approximately until completion of nine years of education. Further, there are special government scholarships set aside for aiding Maoris and Burakumin at the secondary and postsecondary levels, where subordinate enrollment typically drops off (Metge, 1971; Brameld, 1968). The barriers to school access then are not of a legal nature nor, for the achieving "elite" of the subordinate group, a financial one. For example, in 1962, 58% of Maori school leavers left before the fifth form year, whereas by 1969 this figure had been cut to some 36%. Nevertheless, Maoris were leaving school in larger numbers and the qualification gap between Maori and non-Maori had increased (Walsh, 1973). Likewise, Buraku enrollment in Japanese secondary schools has climbed from some 10% of Burakumin primary graduates (compared to 80% of other Japanese) in the 1950s and 1960s (Brameld, 1968).

For subordinate groups in Type B situations, it is the pattern of tracking by subject and regulations governing between-level articulation of schools that take on great importance in modifying the extent of apparent educational access. Japan is now moving to "homogenize" its previously differentiated secondary schools, but there are still rather clear vocational, business, and academic tracks with each leading into closely articulated streams of higher education (Ogbu, 1978). The

vocational track, leading to lower-status positions, finds Burakumin enrolled in numbers far exceeding their proportion of total secondary enrollment (Brameld, 1968). Much the same mechanism is operative in Britain, where West Indians are quickly tracked into the virtually impermeable vocational and trades streams of secondary schooling. Far more disturbing, however, is the tendency to classify black immigrant children as "retarded," a form of tracking with obvious social-psychological implications as well as structural ones. Ogbu (1978) cites figures that show nearly one-quarter of all West Indian elementary students in London are in schools or classrooms for the retarded.

In Type B situations, school access and tracking policies seek to incorporate subordinate group members into the societywide system of roles and positions; but they do so by channeling those individuals into the lower echelons of the system. In contrast to Type A, however, the influence of class is not entirely synonymous with ethnic considerations; large numbers of the subordinate group are also tracked into the low-status positions.

The general tendency of Type B relationships to cultural as well as structural centripetality is reflected in the content of school materials and curricula for subordinate groups. The lack of curricular flexibility is apparent in Britain, where despite their linguistic and institutional ties the West Indians have a very distinct cultural heritage from the society in which they currently reside. The educational authorities have adopted the equivalent of an "immersion" approach, expecting West Indian children to adapt to and absorb standard British culture as well as British educational modes. There are, more recently, special remedial programs for the black population, attending to its "failure" in school achievement (Ogbu, 1978).

Although curricula in schools are principally centripetal in orientation, i.e., recognizing only the dominant culture, there are some cases, as with the Maori of New Zealand, where both centripetal and centrifugal tendencies can be identified.

The introduction of some Maori cultural aspects to New Zealand's schools in the 1930s was in large part an attempt to institutionalize or co-opt the centrifugal Maori "revitalization movement" of that period. In so doing, the government also linked Maori education to "practical skills," thus further controlling the direction of the apparent concession to Maori demands. With the return in the last decades to more openly centripetal tendencies in government educational policies, all New Zealand schools share the same curriculum, one part of which is Maori culture (e.g., dance, music, history).

Finally, it is also in New Zealand where we see the clearest example of between-group language differences in a Type B relationship. In Japan the Burakumin speak the same Japanese as the rest of society, while in Britain the linguistic barrier is one of dialect rather than language per se. Again, the verticality of the relationship in New Zealand and its overall centripetal tendency virtually dictate an English-only policy in the public schools, whether predominantly Pakeha or Maori. The only exception in over a century of this policy was the introduction of the Maori language as one facet of the Maori schools' 1930s effort to reflect more of the local culture. It has never been a required subject in non-Maori schools (if it was offered at all). Further, even in the parallel Maori schools the native language was one course of study; it was not used for instructional purposes. With the migration of Maori to urban areas and their greater presence in Pakeha-

majority schools, schooling does even less to reinforce the language tie.

As the above discussion suggests, Type B relationships are easily distorted by analyses that lean too strongly on either a structural or a cultural perspective. Patterns of societal integration here are such that neither class nor ethnic considerations alone can adequately account for the existing stratification and, most importantly, for the not inconsiderable exceptions to that stratification. The lack of comprehensive barriers between groups in Type B situations allows for some social mobility and, in at least a few cases, ethnic accommodation for subordinate group members--as we have seen in the various school policies. In light of this, educational functions vis-a-vis subordinate groups must be seen, however paradoxically at first glance, as potentially serving some egalitarian and exclusionary ends simultaneously.

Chapter IV

Type C: Cultural and Structural Segmentation in a Horizontal Relationship

Intergroup relations that we classify as Type C are somewhat more complex than either Type A or Type B, largely due to the importance of both vertical and horizontal lines between groups. That is, the two or more groups can be distinguished on the basis of differences in ethnic and cultural attributes--language, religion, traditions, perhaphs phenotype, and so forth--but no one group enjoys a monopoly of political or economic power or cultural and social prestige. Enough balances are present in the relationship--whether historical, cultural, or geographic--to characterize it as horizontal, even where one group may be ascendant in several aspects of societal activity. The ascendant group, if indeed there is one, is simply not so powerful as to be able to completely impose its will on the other groups.

The between-group cultural differences are commonly accompanied by a separation of the groups by residence and by the roles they occupy in society. This separation often resembles a kind of parallelism; groups may reside in different parts of the same urban area, for example, and occupy structurally interrelated and socially equivalent--but clearly distinct--positions in the economy.

It is the sharp distinctions along caste and class lines within each group--cutting across the ethnic differences horizontally--which give the Type C situation its unique features. In this regard there is a tendency toward an elite-mass bifurcation in the society as a whole, which places the upper socioeconomic strata of each ethnic group together

for purposes of political and economic control. Because these class and caste lines cut across the ethnic groups, both the upper and lower strata retain their cultural and linguistic identities. That is, the elites of each group may maintain their culture-based differences while participating in a common web of roles and relationships with other elites. The respective masses of the different groups may likewise participate in a common set of roles that cuts across ethnic lines.

The integration of a society characterized by Type C intergroup relations is, like the society, itself, a delicate balance of group and class/caste interests. Depending on other factors specific to each case, it may be in the interests of the elites to promote a centripetality in which subordinates, regardless of ethnic group membership, are brought into greater occupational uniformity among themselves, e.g., urban industrial positions. Under other conditions--perhaps where the elites are more contentious or less sure of their own hold on society--integration would be defined as the maintenance of any existing role differences between the subordinate sectors of the various ethnic groups. A centrifugal structural tendency of this sort, coupled with the given cultural differences between groups, would approximate a dynamic description of Furnivall's (1948) "plural society."

It is in the area of cultural policies that we would expect to find a greater uniformity among societies with Type C relationships, namely a tendency to centrifugality. In some cases this may be part of a "divide and rule" strategy designed by uneasy elites, but more likely it finds its rationale in the rough equivalence or balance that exists between a Type C society's component groups. There is a consensus, whether tacit or explicit (and not uncommonly won only after much conflict), to allow

the various ethnic groups relative autonomy in perpetuating themselves and their unique identity. Within each group and across the society as a whole, however, there is an unstated class-based centripetality in action; the sharp differences between elites and masses is commonly reflected in a bias toward the elites' standards of culture, language, dress, religion, and so forth, and policies in these areas assume that an assimilation to elite perspectives (if not elite position) is the ultimate goal.

In some respects each of our Type C cases--Malaysia, India, Kenya--leans toward one or another of the other types in our framework. Yet their horizontal rather than strictly vertical coordination, clearly set them apart from Type A or Type B. Nowhere in Type C is there the one-group hegemony seen in Peru, Haiti, Britain, Japan, and elsewhere. In short, our Type C is more extensive and more open perhaps to conceptual modification than the other types we have offered to this point. For that reason, rather than despite it, Type C stands as a separate and unique set of relationships within this framework.

Kenya is ethnically and linguistically fragmented among at least 15 distinct groups or "tribes," each with its own language and culture. Despite their slim plurality in total population, the Kikuyu dominate the Kenyan government, but only in shifting alliances with and depending on other groups (especially the Luo). Inter-ethnic tension and rivalry today can be traced to the presumed (and real) advantages enjoyed by the Kikuyu under both the colonial and national governments (e.g., access to government posts; control of Africanized institutions and businesses) (Cox, 1965).

Crosscutting the ethnic differences in Kenya is the religious factor. On the coast, the Islamic influence is strongest, while in the more heavily populated highlands the Catholics and Protestants have been traditional rivals for African loyalty. Such alliances have split some ethnic groups while drawing differing groups together. Overlaying all this is language. Swahili was long a lingua franca of the area, but with the arrival of the British, English soon replaced Swahili as the most widely used language of government and trade. Neither is native to Kenya nor spoken by more than a handful of the African population as a first language. Both, however, have been valuable as cross-ethnic communication tools (Mutua, 1975).

India is probably the preeminent example of a multicultural, multilingual, class-stratified society. Crosscutting the ethnic lines is religion: 84% Hindu, 10% Moslem, 2.6% Christian, 1.9% Sikhs, and other smaller groups. Even more fragmentary is the linguistic situation; there are between 800 and 1,000 languages and dialects, 14 of which--including English--are recognized in the Constitution as "major" and "national" (Sargent, 1968). Finally, Indian society is divided horizontally by the continuing (albeit unofficial and even illegal) caste system. Sargent (1968) contends that above all these divisions is the one that can be drawn between the approximately 20 million Indians who participate in the "world system" (economic, political, cultural, etc.) and the other 600 million Indians who do not. Sargent indicates that the "elite" group corresponds to no one ethnic/religious/linguistic group, and Schermerhorn (1978) concurs. Roy (1967) also insists on viewing the elite group as ethnically heterogeneous.

Although within Malaysia the Malays constitute only 44 percent of the population, they are culturally and politically dominant. Unlike the rest of the population, they profess Islam, speak Malay, and engage principally in argiculture and fishing in the rural areas. The Chinese constitute the second largest ethnic group and inhabit all parts of the country. The Chinese are primarily engaged in trade and commerce, live in urban areas, dominate economically, speak Chinese, and generally strive to preserve their cultural identity. Indians are the third and smallest of the major groups in Malaysia. They work principally on large rubber, coconut, and oil palm estates and live in rural communities. A majority of the Indians practice Hinduism and speak Malay.

There is considerable tension and strife among the distinct ethnic groups of Malaysia. The dominant Malays claim ownership of the land, view the Chinese and Indians as unwelcome interlopers, and see them both as second-class citizens. Residential and occupational lines are strong with the rural-based Malays dominating politically and therefore controlling the police, military, and civil service. The urban Chinese dominate middle-size businesses, industries, and the professions. The Indians either work on estates and plantations or engage in commerce and the professions. The wealth of the society is distributed by groups, with the Chinese having the greatest, followed by Indians and Malays (Rabushka, 1973).

Constitutionally, the Malays are the privileged sector. For example, Malay is the only official language of the country, and four-fifths of the civil service appointments and three-fourths of university scholarships are reserved for Malays. These and other special privileges, including the counting of one rural vote (Malay) in elections as equivalent to two

urban votes (Chinese) (Rabushka, 1973) reinforce the lines between groups. Much of this political control is a Malay reaction to the apparent domination of the Chinese in education, the professions, the economy, and modern technology (Esman, 1972).

Mechanisms for societal integration in Type C relationships appear to vary according to the elite group's empahsis on structural and cultural centripetality. In Kenya, where there is extreme official aversion to the recognition of ethnic differences and a continuous effort to ignore them institutionally, consensus-building is the most prominent strategy. The elites have agreed to pass over local, i.e., group-specific, languages in favor of two non-indigenous language--English and Swahili--for all purposes except minor local transactions. This inter-elite cooperation has "beheaded" any separatist moves, and thus obviated the need for open coercion. The tendency in Kenyan integration is clearly centripetal and is toward an elite-centered version of a trans-ethnic and essentially urban Kenya.

Malaysian integration is also very centripetal, but opposition to it among the masses of the Indian and Chinese groups has forced the governing elite--predominantly Malayan--to resort to coercion as the principal integrative mechanism. Opposition, in the form of political counter-organization and street protests, has also generated a second, more conciliatory response: a cultivation of existing ties of inter-dependence. Since the Chinese still control the urban economy of Malaysia, the Malayan elite has had to grant certain concessions, e.g., continued control of ethnic-specific education, in order to retain the support of the Chinese leadership.

India, in contrast to our two other examples, appears to rely on a strategy of interdependence to promote national integration. The size of the society's component groups, their long history in the Indian subcontinent, and their concentration in specific geographic areas all work against any attempt at consensus as an integrative mode. As such, the contributions of all ethnic groups and all social classes are highlighted as evidence of a unified nation.

As we might expect, the educational policies are no less complex than those other characteristics of Type C societies. Because Type C relationships reflect an elite-masses division as well as differences among value groups, there is some tendency to organize the schooling along one or both of these lines. Hence, it is possible to find parallel school systems in accord with ethnic group differences as well as schools which are included to serve only the upper or lower classes. Malaysia, for example, retains some ethnic group distinction among its primary schools while at the higher levels a national language and curricula reflect the greater political control of the Malay population.

India's public school system reflects ethnic group differences through the regional decentralization of some aspects of educational decision making. The "concurrent" control over public education shared by the federal and state governments derives from the constitution, which guarantees all religions and language groups the right to establish and administer their own schools, and to hire and dismiss teachers. Although the decentralization in many cases encourages and reinforces societal divisions, with each group and subgroup setting up its own schools, the federal government seems to see it as the only realistic way to deal with the extreme, and often tense, diversity in India

(Gould, 1972). Even so, a certain amount of standardization is exercised through the states' control of educational funding. This very real encouragement of decentralization and local initiative--backed by government funding--appears to offer no structural barriers to initial education for any ethnic/religious/linguistic group or even for the lower castes. Indeed, Gould (1972) argues that in educational matters caste, rather than religion, has emerged "as frameworks for the pursuit of group interests through political action."

Both Kenya and India reflect an emphasis on a parallel system of private schools, which reflect the vertical differences found in Type C societies. In Kenya, the public schools at both primary and secondary levels are so few in relation to the demand for education that a parallel system of private schools has developed in urban areas (for the elites) and in rural areas as well (essentially for the "middle class" farmers and village dwellers) (Anderson, 1970). Well over half of all secondary schools are of the essentially private, self-help harambee type (Court & Ghai, 1974). In India, private schools account for 24% of primary institutions and 70% of high schools and universities. Although these insitutions are funded largely by the government, they nevertheless reflect both value group and caste and class differences (Gould, 1972).

Initial access to schools is relatively broad for all groups in a Type C relationship, but may later favor one ethnic group or class/caste. Likewise, articulation is most evident among academic curricula, the subject matter most often studied by those groups that possess economic and political power.

The role of the schools in supporting these status differences in Type C relationships can be seen in the selection mechanisms used to

restrict access to higher levels. In Malaysia, for example, mastery of the Malay language has recently been required before individuals whose first language is Chinese or Tamil are permitted to enter secondary schools. In India, despite the elimination of primary school fees in the early 1960s and the longstanding policy of "positive discrimination" in favor of the most disadvangaged tribes, castes, and classes, only 25% of all enrollees reach the fourth year of primary school (Sargent, 1968). There is general agreement that economic and cultural barriers are the principal obstacles to higher rates of enrollment and school completion (Sargent, 1968; Laska, 1968; Nanda, 1969). As one example, there is a bias in favor of the larger language groups; individuals from smaller groups, even within the same state, may be able to find secondary and university schooling available only in a second language.

In Kenya, both public and private systems cut across ethnic boundaries, but their cost and location (especially the publicly supported secondary school in urban areas) limit the number and social class of people who can gain access to them. Hence, although the more urbanized Kikuyu are thereby most favored, the issue appears to be one of socio-economic status as well.

To overcome some of the cultural centrifugality present in these societies and to encourage a drawing together around the structural goals of the elites, the Type C educational policies often seek greater uniformity in some areas of the school curriculum. This is most evident in the heavy emphasis on academic rather than technical/vocational studies. Primary education in Kenya, both public and private, is essentially academic in content, concentrating on the liberal arts, mathematics, basic sciences, and English. Virtually the only alternative track is

the one offered by the locally sponsored "village polytechnic institutes." A two-year course in carpentry, masonry, and other locally defined skill area, and taught in Swahili or the vernacular, these institutes draw almost exclusively on students who have been unable to enter the academic stream. There is no evidence that this pattern of tracking or curriculum uniformly favors one Kenyan ethnic group over another. Instead, it does clearly favor students from wealthier backgrounds (because of fees and the English/academic emphasis) and those who live in or close to urban areas. And, even more so than in Kenya, virtually all primary and secondary curricula in India are aimed at university preparation (Laska, 1968).

A second prominent area in which educational uniformity is sought in Type C societies is a school's language of instruction. Except in the cases of miniscule language groups, all primary education in India is to be given in the child's mother tongue. Early on in a child's educational career, however, the local language of instruction must give way to the introduction of regional languages used at the secondary school level. In the universities, the language of instruction issue is again challenged as regional languages must compete with English and Hindi (Dakin, 1968). The language of instruction issue in Kenya and Malaysia is less complex than in India, but the same influence from both the national level and the dominant groups is felt. All public schools in Kenya, for example, use either English or Swahili (increasingly so) as the language of instruction. In this case all of the separate ethnic groups are affected, since neither of the national languages--chosen for reasons of national unity--is spoken by any group in the country as a first language (Mutua, 1975). The imposition of a single language of

instruction also characterizes current school practices in Malaysia. As in India, decentralization and local control are practiced at the elementary school level, but access to secondary school is dependent upon satisfying centralized criteria. In this case, the Malaysian government is proceeding to make Malay the medium of instruction by 1985. English is the compulsory second language in schools, with Chinese and Tamil primary schools permitted as long as students master Malay for secondary school entrance examinations.

As the language of instruction example demonstrates, the Type C relationship builds on its heterogeneity by institutionalizing involvement at the local level even as it retains the ultimate decision-making capacity at the national level. The existence of parallel institutions, like schools, is sometimes congruent with particular ethnic groups in such societies, but more often the institutions reflect the interests of a crossgroup class-based hierarchy.

Not surprisingly, then, it is in regard to Type C relationships that more traditional, focused analyses of education in multi-group societies have the greatest difficulty. The combination of vertical divisions with equally clear, crosscutting horizontal ones defies the use of "dominant" or "subordinate" labels that fail to include both ethnicity and class position. For the same reasons of societal complexity, the examination of particular educational functions and policies must allow for dual (at least) or bi-directional interpretations of effects. Does a certain line of skill training, as just one example, rigidify class lines even as it promotes greater ethnic unity and identity? The Type C case forces educators and intergroup researchers alike to reassess the theoretical implications of their arguments.

Chapter V

Type D: Cultural Segmentation and Structural Commonality in a Horizontal Relationship

We classify relations between groups as Type D when they are characterized by two or more groups that are roughly equal in prestige, political power, and economic power, and that participate in a single structural system of roles and positions. The equality may best be thought of as a balance between the groups rather than a strict parity in each aspect of national life; every group has enough leverage in at least one dimension to be able to substantially modify or veto the initiatives of the other group(s). It should be pointed out that the balance between groups that characterizes Type D situations is rarely a direct function of demographics; rather, large imbalances commonly exist between the size of one of the groups and the size of the other(s). The salient lines are those that run between ethnic groups. Language divisions, for example, may parallel and highlight ethnic differences, but it is also possible for some language boundaries to overlap ethnic lines. Likewise, the language issue may be nonexistent in some Type D relationships.

Interestingly, although the equality of the groups and the inclusive structural system would indicate a high degree of between-group permeability, in a Type D relationship we find instead relative stability in group size and membership. With no one group stigmatized or perceived as completely subordinate, there is little if any incentive to cross group lines. Participation in a particular sphere of national life, e.g., urban industry, may be correlated with membership in a particular

group; but entry to that sphere by members of other groups is not predicated upon a change in ethnicity or group identity. In most cases the system is essentially industrial, with related activities--agriculture, commerce, etc.--that are closely tied to industry and the industrial urban centers. There are no autonomous, self-sufficient economic sectors that serve as group-specific enclaves or "internal colonies." The mutual dependence is such that members of all groups are drawn, although not always proportionately, into nearly all the society's various activities.

The complexity of centrifugal forces is evident in our four examples of Type D countries: Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Belgium, and Switzerland. Although Czechoslovakia's two major languages (Czech and Slovak) are not linguistically far apart, and despite the country's wide adherence to Roman Catholicism, there is a strong sense of between-group differentiation attributable in part to distinct political-historical development over the past 200 years and to differences in rates and types of economic development (Keefe, 1972). This subjective basis for between-group differentiation is even clearer in Yugoslavia where the two major languages (Serbian and Croatian) are very similar except in the alphabet used for each, and where even religious bonds between groups (e.g., Croatians and Slovenes) do little to diminish the sense of distinctiveness. Again, as in Czechoslovakia, divergent patterns of historical-political development and long-standing unevenness in economic development reinforce each group's tendencies toward separateness (Singleton, 1976). Switzerland presents the same general picture of different historical-political development for each group, but with language lines (as in Belgium) sharply drawn. Here, however, each group is linked to a wider European language and cultural community.

In both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the centrifugality is moderated by strong ideologically based commitments to national unity (a structural unity rather than a cultural assimilation or amalgamation) held by the ethnic group or groups which are numerically predominant and/or in a more powerful economic or political position. In other words, the Czechs have been able to impose a centralized order to an extent beyond which the Slovaks might have wished, and yet the residual strength of Slovak centrifugality has been sufficient to retain an explicitly (although sometimes hollow) "decentralized" system.

The centripetal tendencies are somewhat weaker in Belgium, as neither of the two major groups is identified with a specific centralizing ideology nor, at the present, do either have sufficient power (economic or political) to effectively impose an entirely satisfactory model on the other. Unlike Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, where certain ethnic groups have long been more powerful than the others, in Belgium there is a shift in progress, from the predominance of the Walloons to that of the Flemish. As a consequence, former centripetal tendencies in Wallonia have shifted to centrifugal ones, while the opposite has occurred in Flanders (Swing, 1973).

Type D relationships rely on both political and economic interdependence to maintain internal cohesiveness. The political interdependence is evident in varying degrees of governmental decentralization within an overall national framework. The geographic position or the size and power of the various ethnic groups is Type D situations often allow the smaller group(s) in the union to protest or even disrupt the unacceptably centralizing aspirations of the union's larger group(s). The experience of the Slovaks in Czechoslovakia, the Croats in Yugoslavia, and the

Walloons in Belgium seems to bear out the crucial role played by the power of the smaller group(s) in defining the working relationship between groups.

In the European Type D situations, alliance or union at the political level in the late 19th and early 20th centuries did not at first require close economic ties between the associated groups. However, later patterns of industrialization and crossgroup migration for jobs (e.g., Slovaks in the Czech Lands; Macedonians in Croatia) served to strengthen the interdependence of the ethnically defined groups and to put that relationship on an economic as well as political footing. Such patterns have also served to exacerbate latent intergroup rivalries, since one region or one ethnic group (usually the larger) often appears to be benefiting excessively from government or private sector policies while the other region(s) and ethnic group(s)--typically the smaller--add economic deprivation to long-standing complaints of political domination. Belgium, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia are prime examples of this dynamic.

There are two important facets of economic interdependence in Type D societies. First, the national economy itself is fairly well integrated and coextensive with the society itself. That is, there are few if any economic units or activities which operate in isolation from the wider economy's system of supply, demand, and control, e.g., subsistence farming. In European countries of the Type D model, this integration is, as we have noted, part of an advanced state of industrialization and, in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, state-supervised agricultural production.

The second important facet of economic interdependence in Type D societies is the participation of members of all ethnic groups in virtually all aspects of the economy as a whole. That is, occupational categories are not group defined. Although one group may be more heavily represented in one or more sectors (e.g., the Croats in Yugoslav industry, the Macedonians in Yugoslav agriculture, and the Serbs in Yugoslav bureaucracy), we find a good deal of cross-ethnic recruitment which makes these economic sectors relatively permeable. It is a process that can be directly sponsored by the government in the interests of inter-group balance, as in Czechoslovakia's placement of heavy industries in Slovakia (Krejci, 1972).

Educational policies in the Type D societies go considerably beyond those of most Type C countries in the extent of shared governance between national and local authorities. Decentralization in decision making closely follows ethnic group boundaries regionally with the central government intervening to provide a common ideology and national goals. In Switzerland, long-standing historical and ethnolinguistic diversity has been dealt with through fundamental decentralization of educational decision making. Individual cantons are given the responsibility of determining curricula and language of public instruction; in cantons which are themselves characterized by diversity, local areas or groups are often given power over their own public schools. The central or national authorities are limited to supervisorial and coordinative functions. Regional decentralization, often coextensive with ethnic group boundaries, is the approach in Czechoslovakia, Belgium, and Yugoslavia. In these three countries, where centralized control is a competing tendency, "decentralization" may range from little more than

the responsibility for financing local schools (as in Czechoslovakia) to the power to determine group-specific curricular content (as in Yugoslavia). In each of these countries there is a duplication of administrative bodies and functions; regional educational authorities all have their counterparts at the national/federal level, with the latter usually holding most of the final decision-making power.

Centralization of decision making appears to be strongly related to intergroup characteristics in Type D situations. That is, the relative strengths of the groups, and in which facets of national life, affect the structure of educational systems. In Czechoslovakia this has been translated into separate Czech and Slovak "national" education committees which are responsible for much of the burden of financing, constructing, and administering schools within each region. It is the central government, however, which controls the certification of schools and personnel, the approval of curricula, the procedures for movement between school levels, etc. (Golan, 1973; Keefe, 1972). Similarities can be found in the centralizing tendencies of Yugoslavia's numerically dominant Serbian group (tendencies which predate the present communist/socialist ideology) and the resulting control exercised by the federal government over educational curricula, articulation, content, certification, and so forth.

Nevertheless, Yugoslavia's structural decentralization in school matters appears to go somewhat beyond the Czechoslovak approach. For example, the right to establish schools as well as the responsibility for financing them is in the hands of local and regional (i.e., ethnic group) authorities, ircluding factories and other work places (Cekic, 1958). In addition, Yugoslav schools bring community groups into a

limited but official advisory role in their governance. This Yugoslav pattern of centrifugality-moderated-by-centripetality resembles that in Czechoslovakia, but it nevertheless suggests that greater power equality between groups, as well as greater ethnic or cultural differences, is an important contributor to greater decentralization even within the context of a centralist political framework.

Educational structures in Belgium resemble those in other Type D societies--e.g., local control of administration, with national control of broad curricular decisions--but it appears to be evolving in the opposite direction, i.e., away from centralized control towards a greater power exercised by the component groups in their respective regions. The rough equality in between-group power coupled with the absence of a coherent countervailing centripetal force may indicate a continuing trend away from centralized control over the short run. On the other hand, the interdependence of the two Belgian groups (economically within Belgium and politically within the Western European system) may provide that centripetal force when the centrifugality reaches some satisfactory (or perhaps unsatisfactory) equilibrium.

The Swiss educational structures resembles those of Belgium insofar as there are long-standing centrifugal tendencies present in all the major ethnic groups and few if any centripetal forces to challenge them. The result is that there is a greater decentralization of educational decision making. What uniformity does exist might be attributable to structural centripetality, i.e., the desire for incorporation into the nationstate's organizations and economic activities but not assimilation into a dominant cultural model. That is, the Swiss ethnic groups accept centralized supervision and standard setting in recognition of the need

for each group's school products to work in a unified role system, but they reject complete uniformity in process and content.

In the Type D countries reviewed here, decentralization of educational decision making and other functions is a fairly direct response to group pressure on the central authorities, and that decentralization is granted to those levels of local authority that most widely represent the respective ethnic groups. In Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia it is regional because the regions are roughly congruent with ethnic group boundaries, and the same is true in Belgium. In Switzerland, in contrast, decentralized power has to reach down to the canton level (and sometimes to even more local areas) to find relatively compact group concentrations. It may be that geographic concentration is a third variable, along with ethnic difference and equality of power, necessary for group-centered devolutions of educational decision making.

All five of our Type D countries provide primary educational facilities roughly in proportion to each ethnic group's size in the national population. Enrollments are further encouraged by an initial curriculum that, at least on the surface, is congruent with the groups' language and cultural background. Czechoslovakia is a good example of a Type D situation in which special effort has been made to extend schooling opportunities into a region (and ethnic group)--Slovakia--that had been previously characterized by central government negligence, and to do so with some attention to the demands of the Slovaks themselves (Vodinsky, 1965). Belgium has gone so far as to financially support what amounts to four school systems: Church and state-sponsored systems, each further divided into Flemish and French language schools. Type D countries also appear to go to some length to provide initial school

opportunities even to those small groups which do not greatly figure in national politics or the national economy, e.g., Hungarians and Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia; Hungarians and Albanians in Yugoslavia; Germans in Belgium. A similar concern is manifested in Switzerland, where minority language/culture groups within each canton, e.g., French-speakers in predominantly German-speaking cantons or vice versa, are typically attended to by their own schools which are nevertheless publically supported. It appears, then, that Type D intergroup relationships are in fact characterized by conscious governmental efforts to provide equal access for all groups to at least the initial years of schooling.

A second question here--the differential impact (if any) of between-level barriers in the school structure--is harder to assess, given the lack of ethnic group-specific data on level-to-level passage. Yugoslavia appears to be a paragon of between-level facilitation; virtually all primary graduates enter secondary schools, while graduates of secondary schools are likewise guaranteed a place in higher education (OECD, 1970). No fees are charged at any level of schooling, and institutions of all levels are found in each of the constituent regions/republics of the country. Yet close to one-fourth of all primary enrollees fail to complete even half of the eight-year primary schooling (Singleton, 1976), and this wastage is greatest in the poorer areas of the south (Macedonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo). The more prosperous northern regions (Slovenia, Croatia), on the other hand, show higher-than-average rates of enrollment in the largest secondary track--vocational/technical. This suggests that the schools simply reflect, rather than combat, the existing uneven access to well-paying jobs in the industrialized north (Singleton, 1976).

We see much the same circumstances in Czechoslovakia, where great care has been taken to provide proportional access to all types and levels of school by region or ethnic group yet where existing imbalances in economic specialization account for greater-than-average agricultural enrollment in Slovakia and out-migration of Slovak technicians to the Czech region (Krejci, 1972). Likewise, the decentralization and group-sensitive content of primary education in Belgium and Switzerland appears to facilitate equal access across groups and between levels of schooling, but we may have to look closer to see just how real this lack of structural barriers to access is.

All the Type D relationships examined here are similar in their conscious attention to equality of initial access and, to a somewhat lesser degree, to equality of access between school levels. As a structural question alone, access may be seen as an overt response to the demands (political, social, historical) of the various ethnic groups and a reflection of their power to make those demands on an equal footing with other groups in the society. The uniformity in school structure between regions/groups (e.g., equal number of vocational schools in all regions; universities in all regions) is another reflection of that group power. But it is also an indication of the inclusive nature of Type D structural policies in general, which aim at an eventual participation in an economy and society that transcends group boundaries. Interdependence is probably at the root of this, with (at least at the higher levels of schooling) consensus-building another strong factor. Secondary and university education within each ethnic/regional/language area is available, suggesting that assimilation is not an operative concern in Type D access.

Type D relationships are also characterized by a balance in the primary level curricula's group-specific content in the areas of language, folklore, and local history and in the uniformity in the type and number of science, social studies, math, technical, etc., courses which are required. This balance is explicit in Czechoslovakia, where the decision-making rights of the federal and regional governments are spelled out in detail, and even more clearly evident in Belgium where it is the federal government alone that determines the extent of ethnic content in the local schools. Yugoslavia, in contrast, turns all curricular decision making over to the regions--but then retains the right to approve (or disapprove) certain aspects of those curricula. These three countries display a greater governmental control over curricula than is evident in Switzerland; in the latter, it may be that standardization or uniformity is brought about more through the implicit demands of university entrance requirements. In all these Type D relationships, however, the uniform curricular elements far outweigh the group-specific ones in time allotted to each. If we see Type D relationships as a between-group tension (i.e., centrifugal tendencies, especially in cultural spheres) mitigated to one extent or another by centripetal tendencies (e.g., a common role system), then it is clear that in this crucial area of school policy--what is taught--there is enough of a crossgroup consensus to agree upon a fairly standard body of knowledge on all students.

Very careful attention to language differences is characteristic of Type D relationships. National governments, reacting to powerful local interests, provide for mother-language instruction at least through secondary school and often through university training. The only exception to this seems to be Czechoslovakia, where the very small

minority groups are guaranteed only mother-language primary education (Golan, 1973).

Once again, however, we see the centrifugality of multiple languages offset somewhat by the early introduction of at least one other language in the schools. Czechoslovak students all study the second national language, and Yugoslav students all study at least one of the other recognized languages of the country. Only in Belgium is there marked resistance to bilingualism as a school policy (Herremans, 1967). Despite the Type D schools' scrupulous attention to language maintenance, economic forces in these societies tilt the language learning process in favor of one or another tongue in each country. Southern Yugoslavians lean towards learning Serbo-Croatian because of its predominance in the bureaucracy and in industry, and in Czechoslovakia the same imbalances in the society at large implicitly favor the learning of Czech rather than Slovak. Political interdependence may force a country to adopt a balanced language learning policy, but economic interdependence (e.g., industries in one area but manpower from another) may well work against this.

The bi-directional tendencies within the common socioeconomic systems of Type D societies lead to a greater dependence on cultural rather than structural analysis. This is a situation where ethnic parity and lessened socioeconomic competition among groups are more likely to support educational policies for equality rather than inequality. Hence, Type D relations provide the most difficult cases for the education-and-inequality argument, since in these instances schools are least likely to function in an exclusionary fashion on behalf of one superordinate group.

Chapter VI

Summary and Conclusion

We have argued that educational policies related to formal schooling can serve as a basis for analyzing aspects of societal integration in multi-ethnic societies. Because schools serve to maintain the society and culture on behalf of the dominant population through socialization, skill training, and social selection and because schools at least appear to provide an avenue of social mobility and participation for the subordinate population, they can be used as an arena for the study of intergroup relations. We have provided a framework for analyzing the expression of such policies with the hope of orienting future research on education and intergroup relations.

We have pointed out two basic tendencies common to the integration process. These are referred to as homogenizing or centripetal tendencies and differentiating or centrifugal tendencies. As we have indicated, a group's cultural and structural interests vis-a-vis other groups may be either uniformly centripetal or centrifugal, or they may show a combination of the two tendencies. Although the cultural and structural tendencies common to the social and ethnic groups provide a general indication of their interests, the actual mechanisms of societal integration have been dealt with separately. Three such mechanisms were identified in the introduction and were referred to throughout as coercion, interdependence, and consensus. Coercion refers to the attainment of goals through manipulation or indoctrination; interdependence refers to the establishment of a common network of economic and social roles to achieve structural cohesion; and consensus is an attempt to seek agreement on

societal goals. Educational policies reflect such mechanisms, and schools are places where these mechanisms can be seen in operation.

Finally, our concern with policies and the respective tendencies and mechanisms of which they are an expression must be viewed as taking place within particular contexts--social, historical, geographic, economic--that also shape intergroup relations. To provide such a contextual framework, a typology of intergroup relations was developed inductively, based on an analysis of a variety of multi-ethnic societies. The basic concern was with the relationships between group membership and socioeconomic and participatory roles and group membership and cultural identity and values.

Not surprisingly, our analysis of these four types of intergroup relations suggests that overall societal tendencies are reflected in each nation's respective educational policies toward subordinate groups. It is necessary, however, to distinguish between short- and long-term tendencies as well as to assess the degree of dominant group commitment to a policy at any point in time. We find, for example, that all nations require some structural and cultural centripetality to exist as nations over time. Hence, some educational policies are inevitably associated with the need for a nation to achieve a minimal level of compliance and coordination among all groups in the population. This observation appears to hold, irrespective of the integrative mechanisms employed. Beyond this, however, short-term educational policies may very well mask long-term intentions. For example, a Type B society's commitment to utilize a subordinate group language in the classroom (e.g., bilingual education) may actually be part of a long-term strategy to more effectively prepare the subordinates to use the dominant group's language later on.

We also note the importance of differentiating between structural and cultural tendencies in educational policies. Whereas politically and economically the total society in all types of intergroup relations is dependent on individuals and groups occupying appropriate occupational roles, certain types of relationships appear to offer a somewhat greater tolerance for cultural heterogeneity or even pluralism, e.g., subordinate group adherence to linguistic, religious, and other ethnic-specific practices.

Particularly in our Types C and D we find examples of societies that show what otherwise would be considered "contradictory" or "opposing" tendencies in structural concerns on the one hand and cultural matters on the other. Such a balance, we feel, contributes directly to the relative scarcity of educational policies designed to absorb and assimilate subordinate groups to the ways of the dominant population. Rather, the general trend in societies with Type C and D relationships appears to be toward policies that promote acculturation or accommodation in the shape of either greater cultural pluralism or greater horizontality in power and prestige. This is an example of the importance of viewing societal integration from both the dominant and subordinate perspective as such trends appear to be general compromises reflecting the interests of all parties. In these cases, the centripetal preferences of the dominant group are tempered by the resistance offered by subordinates, who tend to seek greater ethnic group autonomy. The result is pressure for further cultural centrifugality by subordinates and a greater cultural pluralism evidenced in educational policies.

Our discussion of educational policies also suggests the need for caution by those who might wish to borrow what appear to be viable

educational policies from one country for application to intergroup relations in another. In this regard, it is important to note the delicate balance of directional tendencies which characterize the relations among specific groups at any given time, and that these relations are not likely to be centered on education alone. This suggests that schools provide only one institutional setting through which intergroup relations can sometimes be studied, and that these relations emerge and are likely to be unique to a particular historical context. The uniqueness of each setting, even among countries within a particular type of society, suggests that altering educational policies will not necessarily lead to outcomes that might have been predicted on the basis of another country's experience.

The value of a typology of intergroup relations is two-fold. As we have indicated in the discussion above, the first value is that it directs the researcher's attention to societal features which place individual cases in a context broader than national borders and particularistic traits. We can thus examine intergroup processes in Britain--or Malaysia or Peru--as examples of general trends or principles. A reading of our type descriptions certainly suggests that there do exist strong similarities among cases in each of the four types, and our concluding remarks so far have attempted to outline what we see as some of the more important of those similarities. At the same time, however, the typology does not imply a continuum of types of intergroup relations nor any assumption of movement from or toward a particular direction. This does not mean that we view societies as static, but suggests instead that we have not directed our attention to mapping either the factors underlying nor the direction of any changes in intergroup relations.

The second value of a typology such as the one presented here is that it provides a framework--a lens, as it were--through which the researcher can examine and compare individual policies as they occur across a variety of intergroup settings. Just as we would expect a specific British school policy to resemble its Japanese counterpart in form, intent, and potential effect because of their similar Type B context, so would we expect that same policy to vary in form, intent, and effect when manifested in Peru (Type A), Malaysia (Type C), or Czechoslovakia (Type D).

It is to this second value of the typology that we now briefly turn. From our country examples, policies related to educational tracking appear to be among the areas most clearly reflective of distinct intergroup relationships. In Type A cases, for example, explicit tracking follows group lines and thereby acts centrifugally, reinforcing the existing between-group differences. Blacks in South Africa are channeled into vocational and service careers, Haitian creoles find their school opportunities limited to primary education and agricultural training, while Peruvian Indians may find no schools at all. In contrast, the equally rigid academic versus vocational tracking that one finds in Czechoslovakia or Belgium--Type D cases--operates across group lines and thus acts centripetally, drawing members from all groups into a structurally homogeneous system.

Other differences between our four types also shape the variations we have noted in school language policies. Policies that aim at one-language use at higher levels of education are culturally centripetal but structurally centrifugal in Type A cases such as Peru and Haiti. That is, individual assimilation to dominant group behaviors and values

is encouraged by single-language practices at the same time that the margination of the great majority of the subordinate group is further reinforced. In the very different Type C setting, on the other hand, single-language policies tend to be much more structural than cultural in their centripetal intent. The recognized position of the nondominant groups and, usually, their languages, makes assimilation an unlikely or untenable goal; the one-language policy for upper grade levels appears to aim at providing a lingua franca (albeit an elite-biased language) that cuts across ethnic groups and thus leads to greater structural uniformity.

A third area of educational policy in which we can observe the differential effect of intergroup type is that of curriculum. The common (i.e., across all groups) curriculum of Type A or B reflects the experience of one group only. It is centripetal in its cultural facet, presenting as it does one "picture" of national reality and national identity. Common curriculum in the Type D context is more limited in scope; the balance among ethnic groups precludes the presentation of only one group's cultural perspective, in effect reducing the commonality to neutral or structural elements, e.g., society-wide requirements in science or technical courses. This kind of curricular uniformity is also centripetal in intent but has structural goals rather than cultural ones as its objective.

Although the framework presented here provides some insight into the relationship between educational policy statements and society types, the analysis has not been able to provide sufficient empirical data to substantiate much of the secondary source material discussed. It would be worthwhile, for example, to conduct case studies where both

policy implementation and outcomes could be assessed, thereby testing some of the directions which seem apparent in the literature on a given country or a given type. Furthermore, some of what appears to be emerging patterns of educational policies according to societal types needs to be investigated to support or refute the typology itself. In this case, we would want to assess the utility of the typology as a predictor of educational policies. Furthermore, additional research is needed on both the tendencies and the integrative mechanisms underlying educational policies, especially in cases where such characteristics result in opposing practices involving several distinct structural and cultural populations.

Unfortunately, too much of the attention by educators to the issues surrounding education and intergroup relations has assumed advocacy characteristics on behalf of a particular group or a particular theoretical position rather than providing explanations for those advocacy positions. Likewise, much attention has been paid to domestic issues surrounding the education of minority groups without taking advantage of comparative and international perspectives of similar experiences. In this regard, it is important to recognize the need for all societies to develop educational policies for the societal integration process and that the analysis of such policies will enable both the scholar and the practitioner to better comprehend the actions of the groups involved.

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15:TJL